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The mainline of the workshop was the transmission tariffs on gas network from a 
European perspective. Transmission tariff is a key issue for the European gas system 
for two reasons. First, transmission tariff should incentivize the efficient use of 
infrastructure and so facilitate the development of competition. Second, transmission 
tariff should also give enough return to network investors so that they upgrade the 
network efficiently compared to their current and future uses not only for national 
infrastructures but also for cross-border pipelines.  
Three issues were especially treated in the different sessions during the workshop, 
namely: 
1° competition and efficient use of the network,  
2° investment in national infrastructures, and  
3° investment in cross-border infrastructures.  
Key conclusions and open questions from the debate among regulators, TSOs, 




The European perspective of gas transport 
tariff  
Considering, the quite broad and explicit frame from the current EU guidelines for 
tariff and investment in the directive 2003/55/EC and the regulation 1775/2005, the 
3
rd package aims at giving a more explicit set of rules to ensure an efficient use and 
development of the gas transmission network in a competitive gas market. The 3
rd 
package then aims to harmonize the tariffs in order to make network use more 
transparent and non-discriminatory, to reduce possible distortions and to increase 
the gas trade between the countries. The 3
rd package is also highly concerned with 
new transmission investments that are either internal or cross-border ones. The gas 
transmission investment and the allocation of its capacity become a central issue 
with the increasing transport demand to bring gas from outside the European 
borders and to increase the gas security of supply. To ensure efficiency of these new 
investments, the EU institutions prompt that they should be based on market 
signals. Ownership unbundling has then returned on the discussion table for two 
issues: how to limit vertical market power of suppliers and, second, how to 
guarantee that the market signals are the main trigger of investments. Some 
regulators tools that might be included in the tariffs guidelines are also currently 
explored.  
The 3
rd package then aims at giving more explicit rules about tariff with a decoupled 
entry-exit tariff and the reduction of the distance component in the tariffs. The 3
rd 
package also aims at giving more explicit rules about investment with the increase of 
incentive regulation for new investments, the development of a European 
transmission plan for the next 10 years and the establishment of an Agency at the 
EU level to arbitrate conflict when national regulatory agencies don’t agree on cross-
border issues. 
But the current methodologies to calculate tariffs and to 
balance the network flows in Europe are very different from 
one country to another.  
The convergence of these methodologies cannot be achieved without difficulties 
because of the high heterogeneity of the national needs in gas and network, in 
particular for the Eastern European countries. Some works have already been  
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initiated to harmonize or at least increase the compatibility between the national 
rules. The EU Commission has just launched a study of current tariffs to understand 
the internal logic of the national methodology of tariff setting and to discover the 
differences in these methodologies that can create barriers to the integration of the 
EU gas market.
1 This study should result in developing policy recommendations 
focusing on the tariff harmonization and on the cooperation between TSOs.  
How to ensure that competition can develop 
and the use of the network is optimized?  
To ensure that the gas network is optimally used and developed and so facilitates 
competition on the gas market commodity, several elements are required. Through 
the first part of the workshop, as reported below, we saw that 1° investor should 
have enough incentive to develop the capacity of the gas transmission network, 
2°  various tools can be applied to increase competition in the transport capacity 
market. 
One of the main challenges to design tariff is currently the 
impact of the financial crisis.  
Indeed, the financial crisis increases the difficulty to predict the interest rate. As a 
consequence, the financial crisis negatively affects the calculation of the correct cost 
of capital through the Capital Asset Price Model. It results that the regulators can 
underestimate or overestimate the capital costs. The financial crisis can also change 
the expected demand for gas and gas transport. These changes may create 
instability in the tariff calculation which can harm the regulator credibility and 
decrease the expected perspectives of revenue for investor, increasing uncertainty 
and so the costs associated to the new investments.  
This kind of instability in tariff calculation for gas transport originated from wide 
economic crises can be seen in some historical examples. It was the case for 
example of the Argentine crisis in 2001 and of the USA crisis in the 80’s. In the case 
of the USA, after the financial crisis in 1987, the regulator has decreased the 
parameter which measures the risks associated to the sector compared to the other 
                                                 
1  “Gas transmission network tariffs and balancing fees in Europe”, project developed 
by KEMA to the European Commission.  
http://www.kema.com/search_results.asp?query=publishes   
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economic assets. As a consequence of this decision, the tariffs were pushed down 
artificially.  
Most of the regulators currently calculate the rate of return on investment Re with 
the CAPM models, Re = Rf + Beta*MRP, where the two main inputs are the free risk 
interest rate Rf and the risk associated to the sector or Market Risk Premium MRP 
(the beta coefficient describes how is the expected return of the asset is correlated 
with the financial market as a whole). Risk free rates have been extremely volatile 
recently. But now they seem to be extremely low. It means that in the next five 
years it may increase, although there is high uncertainty about its future value. 
Beside this problem linked to the cost of capital of gas transmission investment, it is 
necessary to ensure that even in the context of the crisis, the regulators are not 
influenced by the political matters. The tariff stability in this context may be one of 
the main pillars to guarantee investments in an environment with high market 
instability. This tariff stability in the gas transport however is not easy to be achieved 
even outside the turbulence of the financial crisis. This is because tariff setting for 
gas transmission is a new task for the regulatory bodies. For example, in the 
calculation for the CAPM, the value of the Market Risk Premium considered by the 
regulators has varied between 4 and 5%. But the methodology to arrive to this value 
is, until now, quite unclear. In the last years, some mechanisms were applied in 
order to reduce uncertainty in the regulated tariffs. For example, the new Greek 
legislation has decreased the regulatory discretion power in setting the transport 
tariffs. Another mechanism is to use long term arrangements between investors in 
gas transport and network users to give certainty to investors.  
In the tariff setting, the rules that apply to the transport capacity rights are also 
crucial for an efficient use and development of the gas network. In particular, firm 
cross-border backhaul
2 capacity will be useful to facilitate gas transportation over the 
European gas network. And the impact of the rule of “use it or lose it” (UIOLI) has to 
be carefully evaluated. Of course, the UIOLI rule avoids foreclosing the transport 
                                                 
2  Backhaul is a transportation of gas in a direction opposite to the aggregate 
physical flow of gas in a pipeline. This service is typical when the transporting 
pipeline redelivers gas at a point upstream from the point of receipt. A backhaul 
condition will exist as long as the aggregate backhaul transactions are lesser in 
volume that the aggregate forward haul transactions. A backhaul transaction can 
result in a delivery by displacement (reduction) of physical flow at the delivery point 
or even by the change of gas flow.   
5 
 
capacity. However, it also creates uncertainty for the investor in case of exemption 
for gas transmission investment.  
The UK system has a long experience in allocating and developing a gas network in a 
competitive gas market. The UK system has then developed a mechanism to allocate 
capacity based on market signals through auctions. The regulator then sets basic 
capacity levels jointly with the UK gas system operator National Grid that auctions 
these capacities to different time horizons. In particular, the transport capacities are 
yearly auctioned giving rights to long term firm capacity auctions on a unique 
marginal price basis. A reserve price calculated by the regulator sets a minimum 
price to the transport capacity. The capacity allocation is linked to the entry-exit 
system. The auctions are based on the capacity of each entry and exit point of the 
network. The revenue of the auctions is allocated to pay the capacity owners and the 
cost of congestion management. When there is a physical constraint on the network 
day-ahead, the buyback mechanism is applied. In this mechanism, the TSO buys 
back transport capacity to make the rights to transport gas acquired by shippers in 
previous auctions match the physical capacity of the network. The buyback 
mechanism is built under an incentive based regulation, since the cost of congestion 
is partly born by the transmission owner. As a consequence, if the cost of congestion 
increases, there is an incentive for the transmission owner to increase investment in 
capacity in order to reduce congestion.  
 
Along the discussion between the stakeholders, the main 
controversial issues were about the tools which have been 
applied on national bases to increase competition in the 
transport capacity market.  
The discussion has focused mainly on the French release policy that forces the 
incumbent to release a part of its transmission capacity for new entrants and on the 
problem raised by auctions to manage congestion in Spain. 
The gas release program in France was essential to increase the liquidity in the 
French wholesale market, especially in the South balancing region where it is difficult 
to book capacity for new entrants. This program has been seen by some French 
market players as crucial to allow new entrants in the gas market and decrease the 




In the Spanish case, according to some gas suppliers, the auctions of transport 
capacity to manage congestion may prevent these suppliers to respect their firm 
contracts with final consumers. Still according to some gas suppliers the policy 
makers in Spain need to keep in mind that gas is mostly imported (in particular by 
LNG). It creates important congestion in some period of year on pipelines linking 
LNG terminals to the national network. It was also recalled that auctions are useful 
only if there are enough competitors for the capacity.  
How to ensure investment in national 
infrastructure?  
In this part, tariff was discussed as a mea n  t o  e n s u r e  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  n a t i o n a l  
infrastructure. Then national specificities and problems were underlined. Specific 
questions from some EU countries like France, Austria, Hungary, Portugal, Germany, 
Hungary and Holland have been presented showing the heterogeneity of the issues 
which the EU needs to take account.  
In  France, the gas transport tariffs have followed a process of harmonization. 
Harmonisations have taken place between the TSOs (GRTgaz and TIGF) and between 
regions inside the TSOs’ areas. It has been a long process of negotiation between the 
market players that has allowed in January 2009 to decrease the number of regions 
and improve the compatibility between the transport capacity markets ruled by the 
two French TSOs. An investment program was necessary to increase transmission 
capacity between the zones of the two TSOs and the balancing zones in the GRTgaz 
area. This investment plan was actually a consequence of direct negotiations 
between the transport owners and the regulator body. In France the gas transport is 
not a legal monopoly. However the entrance of new gas transporters does not seem 
to be a policy incentivized by the regulation in France. The regulator worries that a 
bigger number of gas transporters will increase the cost of coordination and 
harmonization while this will not really increase the competition in the final gas 
market.  
In  Austria, there is basically only one gas source. The gas transport system in 
Austria attends the internal demand but also has transit functions for gas from 
Russia to Germany, France, Italy and Slovenia. The tariff setting is done based on 
the distance model. In the Austrian case, as the network is not meshed, the entry 
and exit model seems then to have less advantages, even if this tariff model is  
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preferred by the EU institutions. And changing from a distance-based tariff to an 
entry-exit one would increase the costs of tariffs regulation without improving its 
efficiency. In Austria, the main concern about tariff is its level as it provides money 
that ensures the long term funding.  
Hungary is a transit country from Russia to Serbia and Bosnia. The tariff is not 
calculated with an asset based model contrary to the EU guidelines. The main 
argument of this divergence is that it is too long for the regulator to realize such a 
calculation. It rather realizes an indexation of the asset base value following a 
sector-specific inflation rate. However it was underlined that this model does not 
accurately reflect the cost from an economic point of view. The regulator actually has 
an important degree of discretion to stabilize what is the asset cost. This discretion 
power is in the definition of some variables of the models that stabilize the economic 
value of the assets like the calculation of amortization, cash flow and capital cost. 
Moreover, to stabilize the authorized revenue to remunerate efficiently the network 
investment, the regulator needs to make hypothesis about the capital structure 
which gives still more discretional power to the regulator to determine the economic 
value of infrastructure.  
Beside the characteristics of the regulation in Hungary, it was also highlighted that, 
following unbundling, the network expansion was dramatically boosted. This 
exemplifies that unbundling can have a strong impact on the network development. 
However ownership unbundling may be a problem for the development of new 
transport capacity. Indeed, it is still mainly incentivized by long term contract signed 
before the pipeline construction. And Gazprom is one of t h e  m a i n  b u y e r s  o f  t h e  
Hungarian gas transport capacity. This situation raises concerns about the power of 
Gazprom to influence the gas network development, since this firm might have not 
too much interest to increase gas competition in Europe.  
One of the biggest differences between Hungary and Austria is 
the storage infrastructure.  
In Hungary the storage capacity is not owned by the gas transporters anymore, as it 




3. Moreover, this storage capacity seems to be smaller in Hungary. 
The development of new demand for gas from electricity generation has created 
some needs for change in the gas network operation. The gas demand from 
electricity generation is more volatile than other gas demand. And this increases the 
importance of storage capacity and its ownership. Besides, there is no guarantee of 
alignment between the gas and electricity regulation, which increases the uncertainty 
of gas demand.  
Another issue underlined for the Hungarian case is the impact of currency risks on 
investments. It cannot be underestimated for the Eastern European countries and 
should be taken into account by the European Commission to differentiate the 
countries using the euro from the other countries. Otherwise there will be an under 
investment in the transit countries at least in the medium term.  
In  Portugal, the context of strong increase of gas demand from electricity 
generation has become a main issue for the gas regulator and for the electricity 
regulator. It makes the development of the power and gas transmission networks 
interdependent. It may be efficient to realize tradeoffs between investment in the 
development of the power transmission network and of the gas transmission 
network. And consequently it increases the necessity of coordination between 
electricity and gas regulators. The electricity flow comes from the North while most 
of consumption is localized in the centre-south of Portugal. This situation creates 
important energy transits from North to South, which generates important losses if 
this transit is realized by electricity. To the contrary, if this energy is transmitted 
through gas pipelines with electricity generation located close to demand in the 
Centre-South, the energy losses are smaller, especially with the LNG technologies. In 
Portugal the positive externality from the gas transport network to the electricity 
network, which has not been entirely taken into account until now, is one of the key 
element in order to incentivize the efficient level of investment in gas transport 
capacity.  
In  Germany, the main issue is not only to create a capacity market to facilitate 
cross-border trades, but also to create a capacity market inside Germany between 
the different German TSOs. It is another way to deal with the same problems as in 
                                                 
3  This group is a supplier of gas and electricity in Hungary. Through merger and 
acquisitions, it has acquired some assets of the previous national incumbents.   
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France to make several TSOs cooperate inside a country. The German solution 
through the formation of an interregional market is different from the French 
solution. In France, the goal is to decrease the number of regions, whereas in 
Germany, the idea is to create a liquid capacity market between the regions. 
However, the final objective is the same: increasing harmonization between the gas 
transport networks.  
The harmonization of tariffs as it was discussed is central to increase trade between 
regions. However, in Germany, it is the capacity allocation that seems to be the main 
worry of the stakeholders. The market participants are then asking for a better 
market design which allows to trade transport capacity. Policies like tradable 
transmission rights and platforms for exchange of these rights would be essential as 
a first step in this way.  
In the Netherlands, the context seems different from all the others national 
contexts which have been discussed along the workshop. It is the unique country 
that is a net gas exporter. The structure of the TSOs in the Netherlands is in 
accordance with the EU guidelines for the ownership of transport and storage 
infrastructures, open season mechanism to allocate new capacity and incentive 
based regulation of tariffs. However, even if the current investment rates in 
transport capacity are high compared with other EU countries like Germany, it does 
not seem sufficient. In 2009 the capacity commitment has reached the current 
capacity level. In the Netherlands, investment in new capacity is becoming a 
complex matter because the demand for the Dutch gas transport capacity depends 
on demand for Dutch gas from other European countries.  
The lack of investment seems to be currently motivated by the uncertainty on 
demand for gas and so for transport. The demand in the last years has grown faster 
than what was expected. But for the years to come, it is difficult to make good 
predictions about the demand evolution for two reasons. First, an important part of 
gas demand comes from electricity generation. And it is not clear now how this 
particular demand will increase in the next years. This uncertainty stems from some 
unclear regulatory directions about CO2 emissions and the potential technological 
changes from Carbon Capture and Storage. The second reason is related to gas 
supply. The gas transport demand is also unclear since most of gas consumed in 
Europe comes from outside Europe through international pipelines. Considering that  
10 
 
the network planning is currently mainly national, this situation creates uncertainty 
through a potential misalignment between the national interest and the European 
interest as a whole in developing the gas transport network.   
In conclusion, there is a wide diversity of national needs in tariff setting and gas 
transport infrastructures. This diversity is sometimes extended inside some 
countries, as France and Germany, where the transport regulations within the 
regions and at the national level are not perfectly compatible. A high diversity 
implies the question of harmonization at the European Level. In a EU perspective, 
there is indeed no purely national infrastructures. And it is one important 
contribution of the workshop to feed the dialog between the national and European 
perspectives about the problems faced by the gas transport sector.  
How to ensure investment in cross-border 
infrastructure? 
When the formation of a European Market is considered, the national and the 
European regulations must be compatible. However, at the European level, the 
processes of convergence are more complex. This is because there is currently no 
unified EU regulatory body (or other similar institution) which could interfere inside 
and between the countries. And the design of a European market is done mostly in a 
non coordinated and decentralised way by the national regulators and their 
cooperation. 
The different characteristics of gas supply and demand in these different countries 
increase the heterogeneity between the needs for gas transport at the national level. 
As an obvious consequence, it increases the difficulty to harmonize the rules. 
Because of this heterogeneity, the adoption of rules in one country from another one 
can be a mistake from a national perspective only, as underlined by the different 
issues exemplified by the French, German, Austrian, Spanish, Hungarian, Portuguese 
and Dutch cases. That is why a harmonization of tariffs and capacity allocation rules 
does not seem easily feasible in the current context. However the harmonization 
between these rules is necessary to avoid distortion and to decrease the costs of 
transport between the national limits. This might be the EU cornerstone guideline to 




Beside the harmonization of tariffs, the development of gas trade between countries 
also depends on investments in the cross-border transport capacity. In most of the 
cases, the investments in cross-border pipelines result from a negotiation between 
the TSOs of each country with the participation of the regulators. However, TSOs, 
which have guaranteed revenues in their national business, may obviously refuse to 
take a risk in investing in new cross border capacities with no guarantee of revenue 
for these investments. In this context, the policy about the merchant lines may be an 
important policy tool to the EU commission to give incentives to investors for such 
risky infrastructures.  
Until now, it is not clear if the cross border issue will become an EU issue or if it will 
remain a national issue. 
Would bilateral negotiations be the best way to develop cross 
border transport capacities?  
It is clear that this process requires important transaction cost, since the investors 
need to negotiate to receive approvals from different institutions. Nevertheless is 
there another feasible mechanism in the current context? It seems that, until now, 
the bilateral negotiation and agreement between regulators is the main pillars for the 
development of cross-border gas infrastructures. Negotiations between France and 
Belgium or between France and Spain are examples where this process gives visible 
and well ongoing results.  
The whole discussion along the workshop day results in two main opened questions. 
What is an efficient gas transport network or an efficient network taking into account 
the possible different objectives of policy makers (e.g. the three pillars of the EU 
energy policy: competition, security of supply, sustainability)? Is there a feasible first 
best? These two questions were controversial points that have emphasized some 
conclusions and opened new discussions. 
Conclusions and new up-to-date questions for 
policy makers about network development:  
Efficiency for the gas network should result from a combination of technical and 
economic features. Efficiency of the network capacity should be the result of an 
optimisation based on cost minimization limited by technical constraints. The  
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equilibrium should then be reached between the cost to offer transport service and 
the demand value for this service, which can be measured as the geographical 
difference of value between the offer and demand for the gas commodity. In Europe 
many tools and models are applied by the TSOs in order to figure out what is the 
efficient development of the gas networks. The regulator bodies have also worked in 
the direction and/or supervision of these investment decisions in order to ensure that 
decisions for the gas transport infrastructures are efficient.  
However, even if in theory the equilibrium between offer and demand could answer 
some of the questions about network efficiency, the definitions of efficiency and 
equilibrium in the gas network are currently not clear for the moment.  
So, how to define the tariffs, which should be the efficient price 
of gas transport service?  
One hypothesis is that this efficiency point actually depends on the institutional 
characteristics of the gas industry. Comparing the EU with the USA, it seems that the 
institutional differences lead the development of transport capacity through different 
paths. And these two cases may be seen as efficient, if this means equilibrium 
between offer and demand. However the EU model and the USA model are different 
if we compare them from the point of view of competition. 
Many of the policies considered as essential in the EU to build a transport capacity 
market have never been applied to develop the USA capacity market, the most liquid 
of the world. For example, some policies like ‘use it or lose it’ or gas transport 
release programs which have been seen as the best tools to build the capacity 
market in Europe have never been considered relevant in the USA to allocate 
capacity or to define tariffs. The reason of this difference lies in the fact that the US 
model is built on private decisions helped by rules and institutions that permits 
efficient decisions to be taken. The rationale of this model is based on the fact that if 
somebody takes his own money to build a transport asset, this agent will be the best 
one to look for the efficiency of his investment. And if the system in itself is 
competitive, the investor will be forced to act as efficiently as possible.  
The gas transport can be a competitive activity if the institutional frame provides the 
initial competitive conditions. In the US institutional framework, these conditions are 
the following ones: 1- an open and competitive capacity market 2- a gas commodity  
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market open and competitive 3- an open book system of the gas flows through the 
networks. The combination of this ex ante rules and markets allows investors to take 
efficient transport investment decisions in the US context of Federal organisation of 
the gas market. 
Unfortunately, the US organisation is not the ‘best practice’ that should be applied or 
pursue in the institutional settings of Europe, because it is far from being past and 
copy in the EU frame. Nevertheless, it means that there is an open range of 
mechanisms to seek and to develop in the gas network from the diversity of 
centralized mechanisms like in the EU to decentralized ones like in the US. Likewise, 
until now, it seems that it is not clear if there is an inter-temporal first best 




All the papers and presentations of the workshop can be downloaded from: 
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/FSR/ 
 